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Convergences and Omissions in Reporting Corporate and
White Collar Crime
Zachary Bookman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of corporate regulation has changed dramatically in the
last decade as a number of high-profile corporate scandals have been
exposed.1 Some of the notable imbroglios included one of the nation's
largest auditors, KPMG, found to have engaged in tax shelter fraud on
a massive scale. 2 WorldCom notched up the largest corporate insol-
vency ever due to illegal revenue inflation and cost underreporting. A
major dealer in mortgage-backed securities, Freddie Mac, is still under
investigation for serious accounting irregularities.3 The most dramatic
and pervasive of the many corporate fraud cases was probably the
2001 implosion of Enron.4 In its wake came a series of regulatory
moves that are still being felt. In July 2002, George Bush announced
the creation of the President's Corporate Fraud Task Force to maxi-
mize the federal government's ability to enforce the existing legal in-
frastructure.5 Shortly thereafter, the legal infrastructure itself was
amended by congressional passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
* J. William Fulbright Fellow, J.D. Yale Law School, M.P.A. Harvard Kennedy School 2008.
1. See generally KENNETH R. GRAY ET AL., CORPORATE SCANDALS: THE MANY FACES OF
GREED (2005): JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE
SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM (2005); JUSTIN O'BRIEN, GOVERNING THE CORPORATION:
REGULATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL AND GLOBAL MARKETS
(2005).
2. For the IRS publication of the $465 million penalty and a detailed report on the aftermath
of the scandal, see Internal Revenue Service, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal Violations,
IRS.GOV, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=146999,00.html.
3. For an early discussion of the Justice Department investigation, see Ari Weinberg, The Feds
Pile on Freddie Mac, FORBES, June 12, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/06/12/cx aw_0612fre.
html. For a later article that details developments in the investigation, see Kathleen Day, Justice
Probe of Freddie Mac Moving Slowly, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A14651-20040ct31.html?nav=rss business.
4. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM
(2004): KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS (2005); MIMI SWARTZ AND SHARON WAT-
KINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2004).
5. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/dag/cftf/execorder.htm.
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which included numerous provisions aimed at improving corporate
governance. 6
Amidst the maelstrom of scandal and government response, how-
ever, a number of questions have gone unanswered. For instance, on
what informational basis is the President or Congress acting? Are they
undertaking rigorous analysis or merely reacting to a series of corpo-
rate spectacles? This Article argues that the dearth of available data
on the number and size of various corporate crimes makes it almost
certain that legislators, commentators, investors, and average citizens
are making decisions without adequate information. The Article pro-
poses a good first step would be to overhaul the reporting processes of
corporate prosecutions and white collar crime so, as a society, we
could know with more certainty how best to discuss-and legislate
on-the issues.
A simple example will help show the current problem: As the re-
porting arm of the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics ("BJS") reports white collar crime dispositions from
United States federal courts for fraud, forgery and counterfeiting,
bribery, and embezzlement. 7 Published data exists for the years 1972
through 2004. When examining the statistics, one would have a diffi-
cult time discerning the difference between a small-town lawyer em-
bezzling from his trusts and estate practice and Ken Lay bilking
shareholders and pensioners across the country. This is because there
is presently no breakdown between personal and corporate frauds,
and there is no weighting of the particular crimes. The implications
are staggering because surely some types of fraud (for example, mas-
sive corporate misfeasance) are more costly and socially reprehensible
than others (for example, low-level venality). Moreover, one can im-
agine that the various types could be inversely proportional; that is,
one could expect to see a far larger number of simple small town-style
frauds than Enron-type cases. Thus, a single fraud statistic without
definitional breakdown or seriousness weighting is likely to be practi-
cally useless given the skewing that takes place due to the low fre-
quency of massive frauds and differences in criminal enforcement or
deterrence strategies between the two.
In fact, the BJS does not even publish specific data on corporate
crime as distinct from white collar crime. To find such data, one must
review assorted publications from the President's Corporate Fraud
6. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002).
7. Cynthia Barnett, The Measurement of White-Collar Crime Using Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) Data, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/whitecollarforweb.pdf
(last visited May 3, 2008).
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Task Force and various academic studies. For instance, the second re-
port of the Corporate Fraud Task Force listed over five hundred cor-
porate fraud convictions in 2004, an increase of 250 over 2003.8 Nine
hundred defendants and sixty CEOs and presidents have been
charged since 2002.9 A study by Corporate Crime Reporter of criminal
fines revealed that twenty-one percent of the Fortune 500 paid crimi-
nal fines of at least one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in the
1990s. 10 A 1979 study, Illegal Corporate Behavior, found that in just
two years, 1975 and 1976, sixty percent of the 582 largest public U.S.
corporations had an action initiated against them, and almost one-half
had two or more violations.11 Yet, one can quickly see what this re-
porting misses. While interesting, these disparate data compiled over
different years and in different time periods provides nothing close to
a comprehensive picture of corporate crime in America. How could
Congress even know if there has been more corporate crime of late
rather than just more public scrutiny of corporate crime?
A similar story can be told about white collar crime in general.
Again, the BJS is not the only source of statistics on the matter, but
other organizations are hard-pressed and rather poorly situated to de-
liver a complete story. The U.S. Sentencing Commission, for instance,
has published data on fraud, the largest white collar offense, but only
since 1995, and it still suffers from the same level of generality.12 The
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University
does useful and creative work, but is still relegated to using DOJ data
on new white collar prosecutions.1 3 The Journal of Law and Econom-
ics published a study in 1999 measuring the effect of the sentencing
guidelines on white collar criminal penalties, showing that from 1988
to November, 1991, there were 101 corporate criminal convictions,
averaging 2.2 per month, compared to 2.3 for the 142 firms sentenced
between that time and 1996.14 Criminal fines, however, were signifi-
cantly higher, increasing from $1.9 million to $19.1 million.
8. CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT iii (2004),
available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/2nd-yr-fraud-report.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Russel Mokhiber, Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the 1990s, CORP. CRIME REP., available
at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/topl00.html (last visited May 4, 2008).
11. MARSHALL BARRON CLINARD ET AL., ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1979).
12. The United States Sentencing Commission maintains federal sentencing statistics by state,
district, and circuit. See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Statistics,
http://www.ussc.gov/linktojp.htm (last visited May 5, 2008).
13. Agency specific data can be found at Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC), http://trac.syr.edu/ (last visited May 5, 2008).
14. Cindy R. Alexander et al., Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Evidence on the Ef-
fect of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 393, 408 (1999).
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The bottom line is that a comprehensive database of corporate
criminal prosecutions does not exist, nor is there even a highly rele-
vant historical record of white collar crime kept by the federal govern-
ment. A number of different organizations, both public and private,
publish data, but unfortunately each data set is typically narrowly fo-
cused on the needs or subject matter of that particular outfit. To
demonstrate this, Part III of this Article assembles the most complete
collection of data on the subject using each of the major sources. This
will serve to show more specifically what is lacking from a numerical
perspective and how the overall federal corporate crime architecture
is unsatisfactory. Part IV then seeks an institutional explanation of
why satisfactory data does not exist in a single U.S. repository. Is it
simply impossible to obtain? Is the Department of Justice too bureau-
cratic to break with historical inertia? Does the data actually exist and
is simply not made public? These and other political-economic consid-
erations, such as what organizational interests are at stake, are ex-
amined to see how and why corporate and white collar reporting
differs from violent crime and property crime reporting. Part V
sketches a vision for what an effective reporting scheme would look
like, including necessary white collar and corporate distinctions and
the possibility of seriousness or dollar-cost weighting indicators. The
current reporting system for violent and property crime is critiqued
for comparative purposes. The Article's conclusion suggests that the
best way to achieve a more robust reporting vision may be a congres-
sional mandate of the kind that has been issued for sexual assault and
discrimination. A detailed and firm legislative hand-binding would not
only benefit Congress, but the entire community of concerned citizens
and investors.
Before jumping into the possibilities for change, however, Part II
traces the growth of corporate regulation, giving context to the
broader inquiry. Also included in Part II is a discussion on the lexico-
graphical distinctions between corporate and white collar crime, nec-
essary when discussing the topics addressed herein.
II. CORPORATE REGULATION AND WHITE COLLAR OFFENSE
While this Article is concerned primarily with numerical reporting
and the benefits that could follow improvements in those practices, it
is critical to know just what is at stake. This Part gives a very brief
history of the corporate form and the regulation of it, so that recent
events and this Article's consequent recommendations can be seen in
definitional and historical context. A discussion about terminology
follows, as corporate regulation and white collar crime do not necessa-
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rily go hand in hand. Fleshing out the overlaps and differences will
make later arguments clearer and perhaps more forceful.
A. History
In use by the fourteenth century, the early corporate form was pri-
marily adopted by medieval ecclesiastical bodies for the purpose of
managing church property.15 Brickey states that "from these bodies
evolved lay associations, chiefly municipalities, and mercantile and
craft guilds, the precursors of the modern business corporation. ' 16
The effectiveness of this legal structure was evidenced by its growth in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "as hospitals, universities, and
other similar associations adapted to the corporate form."'1 7 As global
commerce developed too, early efforts at venture capital utilized the
joint stock company, a form of business association that proved im-
portant in the mobilization and democratization of credit.' 8
Brickey explains that, in the wake of the establishment of the cor-
porate form, a series of legal principles evolved so that corporations
took on the status of persons: "First, a corporation was recognized as
an entity distinct from its members. Second, corporate property was
considered distinct from the property of its members. Third, a judg-
ment against a corporation could be executed only against the prop-
erty of the corporation, not that of its members."' 9 A fourth principle
of sorts came through the extension of the mortmain laws. 20 These
endowed the "lay corporation . . . with immortality, from which logi-
cally followed the notion that a corporation could not be outlawed or
excommunicated, assaulted or imprisoned; nor could it commit trea-
son or felony. '21
1. Development of Corporate Liability
It was the practice of the common law to grant criminal immunity to
the corporate entity.2 2 They were considered juristic fictions, lacking
15. Kathleen Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observa-
tion, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 397 (1982).
16. Id. at 398. See also Henry Hansmann et al., Legal Entities, Asset Partitioning, and the
Evolution of Organizations 44 (Nov. 19, 2002) (unpublished newly revised preliminary draft, on
file at http://www.law.harvard.edulprograms/olin-center/corporate-governance/papersl
Hansmann-Paper.pdf).
17. Brickey, supra note 15, at 398.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 400.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Lia-
bility: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEo. L.J. 1559, 1571 (1990).
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corporeal members and any ability to act physically. A corporation
was held liable on a presentment for nonfeasance as early as 1635,23
but misfeasance cases were not decided for another two centuries.
2. Development of American Doctrine
In the eighteenth century, royal governors in the American colonies
were frequently granted corporate charters from the British crown.24
When colonies became states, the power to create corporations was
reposed in the legislatures. In Massachusetts, for example, an early
statute provided that "the inhabitants of every town ... are hereby
declared to be a body politic and corporate. ''25 This practice, as
Brickey notes, became "the foundation of most forms of political or-
ganization in the American colonies .... By 1900, the number of in-
corporated cities and towns in the U.S. exceeded 10,000."26
Private business corporations took longer to develop, though, as ev-
idenced by the fact that "[of] the 225 private corporate charters
granted before 1800, fewer than a third were issued to enterprises
whose purpose was to engage in general commercial activity. ' 27 Ac-
cordingly, it was to the more common "public and quasi-public corpo-
rations that criminal liability first attached. 28
3. Nuisance and Crimes Not Requiring Criminal Intent
The law of nuisance provided the earliest mechanism for corporate
criminal prosecution.2 9 Common nuisance was defined as "an offense
against the public, either by doing a thing which tends to the annoy-
ance of all the king's subjects, or by neglecting to do a thing which the
common good requires. '30 Brickey points out that "as had been true
in English law[,] the 'neglect' prong of the definition first was applied
to American corporations. '31 "As the presence and importance of
corporations grew," Khanna notes that courts then "extended corpo-
rate criminal liability from public nuisances to all offenses that did not
23. Brickey, supra note 15, at 401 (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 404; see also Richard L. Grossman & Frank T. Adams, Taking Care of Business:
Citizenship and the Charter of Incorporation, EARTH ISLAND J., Spring 1993, at 34, available at
http://www.ratical.org/corporations/TCoBeij.pdf.
25. Brickey, supra note 15, at 404 (quoting Rogers, Municipal Corporations 1701-1901, in
Two CENTURIES GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 1701-1901 218 (1901)).
26. Brickey, supra note 15, at 404.
27. Id. (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 405.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citation omitted).
31. Brickey, supra note 15, at 405.
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require criminal intent. '32 In legal terms, this did not introduce much
of a problem because individual corporate agents shared no responsi-
bility for the omission, and guilt was not imputed from agent to princi-
pal; the duty fell on the corporation, not the individual.
As Khanna states, "prior to the mid-1800s, it was questionable
whether corporations could be held criminally liable for misfeasances
(positive acts) as well as nonfeasances (omissions). ' 33 The situation
changed in 1846, however, when Lord Denman ruled in The Queen v.
Great North of England Railway Co.34 that "corporations could be
convicted of misfeasance .... "35 According to Khanna, American
courts thereafter "began making similar rulings. '36
Yet in order to find corporations liable for misfeasance, courts had
to find a way to attribute agent conduct to corporations. Khanna ex-
plains that the imputation relied, for logical consistency, on the doc-
trine of respondeat superior ("let the master answer") and, further,
that this development eventually paved the way for courts "to extend
corporate criminal liability to all crimes not requiring intent. '37
4. Crimes Requiring Intent
Brickey argues on this count that the imposition of criminal liability
for crimes requiring intent followed two themes. The first theme was
that the corporation "has no hands with which to strike" and, because
it "has no soul," it cannot have "wicked intent. ' 38 The second theme
was an ultra vires plea, noting some acts are so beyond the purpose
and powers granted by a corporate charter that an entity is incapable
of committing them.39
Both were overcome in 1909, when the Supreme Court held a cor-
poration liable for an intent-based crime in New York Central & Hud-
son River Railroad Co. v. United States. 40 A unanimous court noted
that since Congress is empowered to regulate interstate commerce,
"[i]t would be a distinct step backward to hold that Congress cannot
control those who are conducting this interstate commerce by holding
32. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1477, 1481 (1996).
33. Id.
34. 115 Eng. Rep. 1294 (Q.B. 1846).
35. Khanna, supra note 32, at 1481 (citation omitted).
36. Id. (citing James R. Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65
Ky. L.J. 73, 87-88 (1976)).
37. Khanna, supra note 32, at 1482.
38. Brickey, supra note 15, at 411 (citation omitted).
39. Id. (citation omitted).
40. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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them responsible for the intent and purposes of the agents to whom
they have delegated the power to act .... "41 The Court stated that the
law "cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of business
transactions in modern times are conducted through these bodies, and
particularly that interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands
,42
5. Modern Expansion of Corporate Criminal Liability
Khanna breaks down four historical developments that "facilitated
the continued growth of corporate criminal liability in the twentieth
century: 43
First, federal courts in the United States disregarded European lia-
bility standards as well as the standards laid out in the Model Penal
Code, settling instead on respondeat superior as the vehicle for cor-
porate liability. Second, Congress enacted a growing body of legisla-
tion authorizing the imposition of corporate criminal liability on
corporations.... Third, public civil enforcement became more feasi-
ble after the dawn of the twentieth century, providing the govern-
ment with a tool other than corporate criminal liability that
combined both public enforcement and corporate liability .... The
fourth development is the issuance of federal sentencing guidelines
for crimes committed by organizations.44
As it stands today, the scope of corporate criminal liability in the
United States is very broad. Khanna states, for instance, that "[a] cor-
poration may be criminally liable for almost any crime except acts
manifestly requiring commission by natural persons, such as rape and
murder."45
B. Terminology
Corporate lawbreakers are mostly handled by quasi-judicial bodies
of government regulators like the Federal Trade Commission, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, and Food and Drug Administration.
The administrative and civil enforcement measures generally used in
corporate violations include warning letters, consent agreements or
decrees not to repeat the violation, orders to compel compliance,
seizure or recall of commodities, administrative or civil monetary pen-
alties, and court injunctions to refrain from further violations.
41. Id. at 496.
42. Id. at 495.
43. Khanna, supra note 32, at 1487.
44. Id. at 1487-88 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 1488. As a practical matter, however, the growth of deferred prosecution agree-
ments has changed the corporate landscape dramatically.
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With so many competing actions, some experts prefer an expansive
definition of corporate crime, defining it as "any act committed by
corporations that is punished by the state, regardless of whether it is
punished under administrative, civil, or criminal law."' 46 This broadens
the definition of crime beyond the criminal law, which is the only gov-
ernmental action for ordinary offenders. For clarity, this Article
mostly ignores civil regulatory action in favor of focusing on criminal
fines and sentencing of corporate executives and white collar defend-
ants under traditional criminal law prosecutions.
1. Corporate Crime: A Type of White Collar Crime
When sociologist Edwin Sutherland coined the phrase "white collar
crime" in a 1939 speech, he defined it as "crime committed by a per-
son of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupa-
tion. '' 47 His definition generated controversy, and is now regarded as
too restrictive, the class of the offender being irrelevant. 4 In 1970,
Edelhertz refined the issue by averring that white collar crime is "an
illegal act committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or
guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid payment or loss of money
or property, or to obtain business or personal advantage. ' 49 It is this
updated definition, in its basic tenor, which has informed present
policy.
2. Occupational Verses Corporate Crime
Scholars have attempted to separate white collar crime into two
types: occupational and corporate. Occupational crime is committed
largely by individuals or small groups in connection with their jobs. It
includes embezzling from an employer, theft of merchandise, income
tax evasion, and manipulation of sales, fraud, and violations in the sale
of securities.50 Corporate crime, on the other hand, is enacted by col-
lectivities or aggregates of discrete individuals. If a corporate official
violates the law in acting for the corporation it is deemed a corporate
crime, but if he or she gains personal benefit in the commission of a
crime against the corporation, as in the case of embezzlement of cor-
46. CLINARD ET AL., supra note 11.
47. J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS L. REV. 1199,
1205-06 (1999) (quoting Sutherland and noting that Sutherland used the term in a 1939 speech,
entitled "The White-Collar Criminal," that he gave to a joint meeting of the American Sociologi-
cal Society and the American Economic Association).
48. Id.
49. HERBERT EDELHERTZ, THE CRIMINAL ELITE 3 (1970).
50. CLINARD ET AL., supra note 11.
356 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
porate funds, it is occupational crime.51 In addition, a corporation can-
not, of course, be jailed, and, thus, the major penalty to control
individual violators is not available for corporations per se.
As recent scandals have shown, this breakdown is not entirely help-
ful. The lines between occupational and corporate crime therefore fre-
quently blur, and this reality is not merely semantic. Corporate
executives, such as those in Enron, can steer entire companies down
fraudulent paths, as well as manipulate the same company for their
own benefit. The DOJ and other institutions have struggled with how
to properly a) prosecute corporations and individual perpetrators and
b) record and compile accurate data on corporate and white collar
crime. The rise of deferred and non-prosecution agreements in recent
years is strong evidence of the thorny issues facing prosecutors. Indict-
ment of corporate executives is not necessarily the end of a business,
but indictment of the corporation may well be.52 In terms of record-
keeping, there can be little doubt that the lack of a single, clear defini-
tion of corporate crime has contributed to the relative dearth of statis-
tical data.
III. THE DATA
Eight studies are canvassed below, representing a multitude of in-
quiries. Collectively, they offer a range of data on both white collar
crime statistics and corporate criminal prosecutions. The studies are
ordered chronologically, so as to impart a sense of the evolution of
this field of study and the regulatory environment that has driven the
data. The special aim of this approach is to demonstrate that, while
interesting and reflective of a number of trends, even the sum total of
the data leaves basic questions unanswered, such as how much corpo-
rate crime there is in America, or what the level of growth of corpo-
rate and white collar crime is in the United States.
51. This can cause confusion, when, as was the case in numerous recent scandals, the execu-
tive gains tremendously from increased share prices.
52. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of De-
partment Components and United States Attorneys 1 (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate__guidelines.htm. In 2003, then-Deputy Attorney General, Larry
Thompson, laid out what firms should do to avoid a corporate indictment, including waiving
attorney-client privilege and leaving accused employees to their own devices. The effect of this
highly controversial memorandum arose because of the coercive weight of a corporate indict-
ment. For a journalistic analysis, see Editorial, Corporate Injustice, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2006, at
A14.
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A. Sutherland's Conclusion
Edwin Sutherland, "arguably the premier American sociological
criminologist of the 20th century," carried out the first empirical effort
in the field.5 3 In 1949, he published White Collar Crime, a twenty-year
study of the illegal behavior of seventy of the two hundred largest
U.S. non-financial corporations in the United States. 54 More aptly ti-
tled "Corporate Crime," he concluded that a full nine-tenths of these
corporations broke advertising, labor, trade, patent, copyright, and
other laws in the course of their daily business. Melodramatically, he
opened his book by noting, "Business is crime."'55
In total, Sutherland found 980 infractions over those twenty years,
amounting to an average of fourteen per corporate entity. As a result,
he asserted that corporate crime was not a phenomenon exclusive to a
select few venal executives. Instead, as the Miami Herald summarized
his hypothesis in the wake of the Enron scandal, "just as novice street
criminals learn their trade through association with more seasoned of-
fenders, executives learn the attitudes that result in corporate crime in
the normal course of business. '56
Sutherland's findings have been confirmed in more recent research
by sociologists Amitai Etzioni and Marshall Clinard. Etzioni found
that over a nine-year period (1975-1984), sixty-two percent of Fortune
500 companies were involved in corrupt practices such as price fixing,
bribery, and violations of environmental laws. 57 A more in-depth
study by Clinard, discussed next, found that forty-five percent of the
582 largest U.S. corporations were involved in some wrongdoing over
a two-year period in 1975-1976.58
B. 1979 Federal Study on Illegal Corporate Behavior
Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager conducted an empirical investi-
gation of the 582 largest publicly owned corporations in the United
States for two years during 1975 and 1976.59 It was first published in
53. Max Castro, Corporate Crime: Is There Hope For a New Ideology, MIAMI HERALD, July
30, 2002. The Encyclopedia of Criminology notes that his 1934 textbook, Principles of Criminol-
ogy, was to become "the most influential textbook in the history of criminology." Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group, Encyclopedia of Criminology, http://www.routledge-ny.com/reflcrimi-
nology/sutherland.html (last visited May 5, 2008).
54. EDWIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 17 (1949).
55. Castro, supra note 53.
56. Id.
57. Amatai Etzioni, Is Corporate Crime Worth the Time?, 73 Bus. & Soc. REV. 32, 33 (1990).
58. CLINARD ET AL., supra note 11. See also MARSHALL BARRON CLINARD & PETER C. YE-
AGER, CORPORATE CRIME 256-273 (New York Free Press 1980) (1979).
59. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 58, at 255-72.
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1979 by the DOJ, and, then, a year later in 1980, it came out in book
form. 60 Of the firms covered in the study, 477 fell in the manufactur-
ing sector with a smattering in wholesale (18), retail (66), and services
(21).61 Annual revenues ranged from a few hundred million to tens of
billions, with an average volume of $1.7 billion.62 Methodologically,
the authors noted that they included all enforcement actions obtaina-
ble, with actions initiated or imposed by twenty-four federal agencies
during 1975 and 1976.63 Though the study revealed a wide range of
corporate misdeeds and government responses, one problem with this
approach is that by including any enforcement action, the focus was so
broad as to make criminal and civil differentiations difficult to
ascertain.
1. Findings
More than three-fifths of the corporations profiled found them-
selves the recipients of some type of government action.64 Approxi-
mately half were cited for "severe" or "moderately severe" violations,
according to a multi-variable definition by the authors.65 Interestingly,
the larger corporations were found to have committed a dispropor-
tionate number of violations.66
A total of 1,553 federal cases were begun against all 582 corpora-
tions during 1975 and 1976, making for an average of 2.7 federal cases
each.67 Of the 582 corporations, 350 (60.1%) were dealt one or more
federal action, and, for these firms (those with at least one action), the
average was 4.4.68 Around forty percent of both the total group of 582
corporations and the 477 manufacturing firms were not charged with
any violations during the two-year period.69
For the manufacturing corporations studied, 1,529 sanctions were
imposed. 70 Most were not severe; for example, twice as many warn-
ings were issued than any other type of sanction, and an average of 3.9
warnings were issued for those corporations who were issued at least
60. CLINARD ET AL., supra note 11; MARSHALL BARRON CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER,
CORPORATE CRIME 256-273 (New York Free Press 1980) (1979).
61. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 58, at 255-72.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 58, at 255-72.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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one.7' Consent orders and consent decrees were widely given, making
up 12.9% of the sanctions.72 Clinard gives the breakdown as follows:
Of 1,529 sanctions in total, 1,446 were primary enforcement actions;7
3
44.2% were warnings, including recalls;74 23.4% were monetary penal-
ties;7 5 17.6% were unilateral orders;76 12.4% were consent orders;77
and 2.4% were injunctions and other types of sanctions. 78 The average
number of enforcement actions was three per corporation; 79 4.5 for
the 321 corporations with at least one.80 About one-third of the corpo-
rate entities received a warning at least, and roughly the same propor-
tion received unilateral as well as consent orders. 81 Two of ten had, at
minimum, a monetary penalty assessed against them and one of ten
had at least one injunction imposed.8 2
The authors found that rates of recidivism varied from about
twenty-five percent to as high as sixty percent for ordinary crime. 83 It
is interesting to compare these rates with those in the field of corpo-
rate sanctions. In Sutherland's study, for instance, a very high rate of
recidivism was found. 84 He found that the average corporation had an
enforcement action taken against it fourteen times and that 97.1%
were recidivists in the sense of having two or more adverse decisions
against them.85 The forty-one criminally convicted corporations had
an average of four such convictions each.86 The sixty firms found in
violation of restraint of trade averaged 5.1 decisions, with one-half to
three-fourths of the corporations engaged in such practices so regu-
larly that Sutherland termed them habitual. 87
In the Clinard study, of the 477 manufacturing corporations, 210, or
almost one-half, had two or more legal actions completed against
them during 1975 and 1976;88 18.2% had five or more.89 For serious
71. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 58, at 255-72.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 58, at 255-72.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 58, at 255-72.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. SUTHERLAND, supra note 54.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 58, at 255-72.
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and moderately serious violations, 124 firms, or one-fourth, had two
or more actions, and 7.8% had five or more. 90 If one could extrapolate
the number of sanctions over the average equivalent period used by
Sutherland, the result would far exceed an average of fourteen. 91
2. Corporate Executive Criminal Prosecution
One and a half percent of the cases profiled involved the conviction
of a corporate officer. 92 Of the fifty-six executives convicted in total,
ninety-one percent were for federal antitrust violations, five percent
for financial or tax infractions, and four percent for federal food and
drug laws. 93 In sum, sixteen officers of the 582 corporations were sen-
tenced to 594 days of imprisonment (not suspended sentences) com-
bined, though it should be noted that 360 days (60.6%) were
accounted for by two officers who received six months each in a single
case.94 Of the remaining 234 days, one officer received a sixty-day sen-
tence, another forty-five days, and a third received thirty days.95 The
average for all imprisoned executives was 37.1 days.96
C. Bureau of Justice Statistics
The BJS collects information on offenses considered to be white
collar crimes, including fraud, forgery and counterfeiting, bribery, and
embezzlement. 97 Below is a comprehensive listing of these four crimes
by year. Note that these are dispositions from federal courts, referring
to those who are initially prosecuted, whether or not convicted or sen-
tenced. 98 Conspicuously, there is no breakdown between individuals
and corporations.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. At twenty years for Sutherland's study, a simple comparison of the two will flesh this
out since one-half of the firms had two or more over a two year period, with many having far
more than that. SUTHERLAND, supra note 54.
92. CLINARD ET AL., supra note 11.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Barnett, supra note 7.
98. Id.
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FORGERY AND
FRAUD COUNTERFEITING BRIBERY EMBEZZLEMENT
1972 2,930 5,311 160 1,835
1974 3,831 4,992 315 1,769
1976 4,760 5,044 235 1,910
1978 5,909 3,887 197 2,044
1979 6,220 3,176 197 1,832
1980 5,607 2,312 159 1,581
1981 5,712 2,102 220 1,919
1982 5,808 2,280 206 2,168
1983 7,029 2,752 192 2,137
1984 7,186 2,426 214 1,922
1985 7,094 2,372 236 1,950
1986 7,793 2,671 225 1,950
1987 8,854 2,529 237 2,263
1988 9,071 2,070 211 2,109
1989 8,946 1,733 255 2,036
1990 8,808 1,774 264 1,966
1991 8,562 1,503 265 2,062
1992 8,748 1,446 318 1,986
1994 9,139 1,400 327 1,641
1995 9,198 1,194 284 1,374
1996 9,831 1,215 237 1,291
1997 10,806 1,325 200 1,220
1998 10,413 1,556 211 1,285
1999 10,417 1,535 197 1,322
2000 10,165 1,421 203 1,236
2001 10,268 1,383 244 1,084
2002 10,722 1,544 163 1,048
2003 11,066 1,275 132 1,038
2004 10,499 1,165 156 859
TABLE No. 1: WHITE COLLAR FEDERAL COURT PROSECUTIONS99
The data reveals a strong rise in fraud through the 1970s and 1980s,
with a slowing rate of increase in the 1990s. 100 The period from 2000
through 2004 shows barely any rise at all; though in its 2005 report on
fraud, PWC Global reported a more dramatic rise from 2003 to
99. Id.
100. Id.
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2005.101 Rates of prosecution for forgery and counterfeiting dropped
steadily over the decades to about one-third of their 1972 value. t0 2
Bribery rose intermittently, but was virtually even thirty-two years
later. 10 3 Embezzlement dropped by half after holding steady through
the 1970s and 80s. 104
D. Study on Criminal Fines Before and After Sentencing Guidelines
Before 1984, corporate criminal defendants were essentially faced
with the same set of penalties applicable to natural persons.10 5 Fines
were thus fairly small. According to the authors of this study, Alexan-
der, Arlen, and Cohen, "60% of the fines imposed on corporations
were less than $10,000, with an average fine of about $46,000. ' 106
Twice in the 1980s (1984 and 1987), Congress passed laws with an eye
toward strengthening corporate sanctions by upping the maximum
penalties.10 7 The study explains, however, that despite an increase in
corporate fines, they still "generally remained less than the loss esti-
mated to have been caused by the offense.' 0 8
The Sentencing Commission responded to this perceived lacuna by
drafting stiff federal Guidelines by which convicted organizations
would be sentenced. 0 9 These Guidelines became effective on Novem-
ber 1, 1991, after congressional approval.110 The Guidelines "purport
to constrain judges' discretion over criminal fines, non-fine criminal
sanctions (such as restitution), and non-monetary sanctions (such as
probation)," with a general goal of increasing both monetary and non-
monetary corporate sanctions."'
In their effort to determine the effect of the sentencing guidelines,
the authors focused exclusively on public corporations. They used a
data set consisting of all the criminal offenses for which public corpo-
101. PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRIME SURVEY 2005 (Kai Bussman
et al. eds., 2005), available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/insights.nsf/docid/A548CD55456C7B
8785257371005DDBB4/$file/PwC_2005GECS.pdf.
102. Barnett, supra note 7.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Alexander et al., supra note 14, at 395.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manuals, http://
www.ussc.gov/guidelin.htm (last visited May 6, 2008).
110. An overview of the Organizational Guidelines can be found online; see United States
Sentencing Commission, Organizational Guidelines, http://www.ussc.gov/orgguide.htm (last vis-
ited May 6, 2008).
111. Alexander et al., supra note 14, at 395.
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rations were sentenced by federal courts during the 1988 through 1996
period. The study identified 243 sentences of public firms in total dur-
ing those years. 112
1. Types of Crimes
Table No. 2 below presents initial statistics comparing pre-Guide-
lines and post-Guidelines penalties. It characterizes the 243 criminal
cases according to the type of crime and the conditions under which
sentencing occurred. One can see that "about 40% (101 out of 243)
are pre-Guidelines cases," while "the other 60% were sentenced after
the Guidelines took effect. 11 3 Of the 142 Guidelines-era cases, 105
are "unconstrained," meaning that occurred before November 1, 1991,
or involved offenses that the fine provisions do not speak to, such as
environmental, food and drug, wildlife, safety, and export viola-
tions.114 The remaining 34 post-Guidelines offenses were sentenced
under the Guidelines' fine provisions.
PRE- ERA
GUIDELINES UNCONSTRAINED CONSTRAINED SUBTOTAL COMBINED
CRIME
CATEGORIES NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
Antitrust 25 24.8 22 20.9 16 47.1 38 26.8 63 25.9
Environmental 18 17.8 31 29.5 0 0 31 21.8 49 20.2
Fraud 38 37.6 19 18.1 8 23.5 28 19.7 66 27.3
Campaign
Donations 0 0 2 1.9 3 8.8 5 3.5 5 2.1
Export
Violations 3 3.0 6 5.7 0 0 6 4.2 9 3.7
Foreign Bribery 3 3.0 2 1.9 0 0 2 1.4 5 2.1
Food and Drug 7 6.9 10 9.5 0 0 10 7.0 17 7.0
Import
Violations 0 0 1 .9 1 2.9 3 2.1 3 1.2
Safety 3 3.0 3 2.9 0 0 3 2.1 6 2.5
Tax 2 2.0 2 1.9 1 2.9 3 2.1 5 2.1
Wildlife 1 1.0 2 1.9 0 0 2 1.4 3 1.2
Miscellaneous 1 1.0 5 4.8 5 14.7 11 7.7 12 4.9
Total 101 105 34 142 243
TABLE No. 2: TYPE & NUMBER OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCES
OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, 1988-96115
In total, "fraud constitutes the single largest source of convicted
wrongdoing by publicly held firms, accounting for 27% of all convic-
112. Id. at 405.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 406.
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tions.116 The authors note that "although fraud constitutes 38% of
pre-Guideline convictions, it comprises only 20% of post-Guidelines
cases."
11 7
Antitrust and environmental offenses also feature prominently in
the data, making up "26% and 20% of all cases, respectively."' 18 The
authors show that "antitrust sentences rose from 25% of pre-Guide-
lines cases to 27% during the post-Guidelines era and 47% of cases
sentenced under the Guidelines."1 9 The study stated that the "the
percentage of crimes involving environmental offenses rose slightly
from 18% to 22% in the post-Guidelines era. '120 They found this sur-
prising since both antitrust and the Environmental Protection Agency
began policies at this time of not pursuing criminal charges against
firms that voluntarily took steps to deter, report, and correct
wrongdoing. 12'
2. Number of Crimes
Alexander and the other researchers noted the following statistics
resulting from their study:
PRE-
YEAR GUIDELINES CONSTRAINED UNCONSTRAINED SUBTOTAL TOTAL
1988 19 0 0 0 19
1989 27 0 0 0 27
1990 29 0 0 0 29
1991 26 0 2 2 28
1992 0 0 29 29 29
1993 0 3 28 32 32
1994 0 11 17 28 28
1995 0 10 21 31 31
1996 0 10 8 20 20
Total 101 34 105 142 243
TABLE No. 3: FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCES OF PUBLIC
CORPORATIONS, BY YEAR OF SENTENCE
1 2 2
As shown in the last column of Table No. 3, above, there were simi-
lar numbers of corporate criminal convictions before and after the
116. Alexander et al., supra note 14, at 405.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 407.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Alexander et al., supra note 14, at 407.
122. Id.
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Guidelines went into effect. 123 The 101 sentences imposed from 1988
through November 1, 1991, represent an average sentencing rate of
2.2 per month, compared to 2.3 per month for the 142 firms sentenced
between 1991 and 1996.124 The absence of an increase in the rate at
which corporations have been sentenced is inconsistent with the idea
that prosecutors would respond to higher penalties by seeking more
frequent prosecution.
3. Criminal Fines
The following table compares fines and total sanctions both from
1988 to October of 1991 and from November of 1991 to 1996 for only
those cases sentenced under the guideline provisions: 125
NUMBER OF
CASES MEAN ($) MEDIAN ($) MAXIMUM ($)
Pre-November 1991 cases,
fine only 99 1,918,309 632,661 28,799,559
Guidelines-constrained
cases, fine only 34 19,050,717 3,095,460 340,000,000
Pre-November 1991 cases,
total sanctions 101 114,985,458126 1,612,775 10,281,442,731
Guidelines-constrained
cases, total sanctions 34 49,261,188 4,427,608 646,233,198
TABLE No. 4: PRE-NOVEMBER 1991 COMPARISON TO GUIDELINE-
CONSTRAINED SANCTIONS, 1988-96127
As shown in Table No. 4, above, criminal fines are significantly
higher in Guidelines-constrained cases than they were previously. The
average fine imposed on a publicly held firm rose from $1.9 million to
$19.1 million, representing a ten-fold jump.128 The median fine rose by
roughly five times from $633 thousand to $3.1 million. 129 Also of note,
the percentage of fines over one million dollars increased from 37% to
59% and the percentage of fines that were relatively small ($50,000 or
less) decreased from 15% to 5%.130
Total sanctions, as defined in the study, include the pecuniary fine
and a variety of other penalties like "restitution, disgorgement, reme-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 409.
126. This number includes a $10.3 billion total sanction of Exxon Valdez. If that number were
excluded, the mean would be $13.3 million.
127. Alexander et al., supra note 14, at 409. Note that all dollars are updated to 1996.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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dial orders, forfeiture, assessments, and compensation to the govern-
ment for its expenses in enforcing probation," plus civil penalties and
even private liability.13' Table No. 4 reveals that pecuniary sanctions
increased, with the median rising from $1.6 to $4.4 million. Alexander
and others point out that though "although the mean total sanction
decreased from $115 million to $49.3 million, when one outlier is ex-
cluded the total mean sanction increase from $13.3 million to $49.3
million - a nearly fourfold increase."'1 32
E. United States Sentencing Commission
The Sentencing Commission has published data since 1995. Table
No. 5 below is an amalgamation from each year of the number of
cases for each of seven white collar offenses. Included also is the per-
centage the offense represents of all guidelines-constrained cases. 133
FORGERY & MONEY
YEAR FRAUD EMBEZZLEMIEN COUNRFEITING BRIBERY TAX LAUNDERING ANTITRUST
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
1995 5,909 15.4 815 2.1 790 2.1 303 0.8 744 1.9 832 2.2 18 0.0
1996 6,028 14.2 787 1.9 730 1.7 256 0.6 851 2.0 827 2.0 15 0.0
1897 6,929 14.2 834 1.7 666 1.4 279 0.6 996 2.0 895 1.8 11 0.0
1998 6,330 12.5 770 1.5 776 1.5 252 0.5 859 1.7 913 1.8 11 0.0
1999 6,199 11.2 959 1.7 1,295 2.3 196 0.4 728 1.3 1,001 1.8 44 0.1
2000 6,286 10.5 940 1.6 1,314 2.2 257 0.4 769 1.3 991 1.7 40 0.1
2001 6,691 11.2 764 1.3 1,272 2.1 254 0.4 572 1.0 918 1.5 19 0.0
2002 7,108 11.1 734 1.1 1,466 2.3 168 0.3 622 1.0 940 1.5 17 0.0
2003 7,468 10.7 761 1.1 1,267 1.8 169 0.2 490 0.7 831 1.2 12 0.0
2004 7,261 10.4 630 0.9 1,182 1.7 166 0.2 515 0.7 842 1.2 11 0.0
2005 6,809 9.4 577 0.8 1,083 1.5 199 0.3 604 0.8 934 1.3 18 0.0
TABLE No. 5: DISTRIBUTION OF SENTENCED GUIDELINE
DEFENDANTS BY PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY' 3 4
Fraud is the largest offense each year and has sustained modest ab-
solute growth, but it has declined substantially overall in percentage
representation.1 35 Embezzlement has dropped by a third, and its rep-
resentation among all sentences has dropped by over a half.136 For-
gery and counterfeiting saw a fifty percent rise over the eleven year
131. Id.
132. Alexander et al., supra note 14, at 411.
133. This chart is aggregated from online data; see United States Sentencing Commission,
Federal Sentencing Statistics, http://www.ussc.gov/linktojp.htm (last visited May 5, 2008).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
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period, but a decline in percentage terms by a quarter. 137 Bribery fell
by one-third, and its percentage representation by over one-half.1 38
Tax dropped by fifteen percent, and its representation of the whole by
over one-half.139 Money laundering rose thirteen percent in absolute
terms, but fell forty percent in percentage terms.140 Antitrust saw fluc-
tuations around 2000, but was level by 2005.141
F. Corporate Criminal Fines in the 1990s
The following table shows the hundred largest criminal fines paid by
corporations that pled guilty or no-contest in the 1990s. 142 Fourteen
categories of crime are represented: environmental, antitrust, fraud,
campaign finance, food and drug, financial, false statements, illegal
exports, illegal boycott, worker death, bribery, obstruction of justice,
public corruption, and tax evasion.
2006 FORTUNE
COMPANY CRIME FINE DATE 500 RANKING
1. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. Antitrust $500 mil. 05/99
2. Daiwa Bank Ltd. Financial $340 mil. 03/96
3. BASF Aktiengesellschaft Antitrust $225 mil. 05/99
4. SGL Carbon Antitrust $135 mil. 05/99
5. Exxon Corp. Shipping Environmental $125 mil. 03/91 2
6. UCAR International, Inc. Antitrust $110 mil. 04/98
7. Archer Daniels Midland Antitrust $100 mil. 10/96 52
8. Banker's Trust (tied) Financial $60 mil. 03/99
8. Sears Bankruptcy Svcs (tied) Fraud $60 mil. 02/99
10. Haarman & Reimer Corp. Antitrust $50 mil. 02/97
11. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. Environmental $37 mil. 06/98
12. Hoechst AG Antitrust $36 mil. 05/99
13. Damon Clinical Labs, Inc. Fraud $35.2 mil. 10/96
14. C.R. Bard Inc. Food and Drug $30.9 mil. 10/93
15. Genentech Inc. Food and Drug $30 mil. 04/99
16. Nippon Gohsei Antitrust $21 mil. 07/99
17. Pfizer Inc. (tied) Antitrust $20 mil. 07/99 25
17. Summitville Mining (tied) Environmental $20 mil. 05/96
137. See id.
138. See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Statistics, http://www.ussc.
gov/linktojp.htm (last visited May 5, 2008).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Mokhiber, supra note 10.
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19. Lucas Western Inc. (tied) False Stints. $18.5 mil. 01/95
19. Rockwell Int'l Corp. (tied) Environmental $18.5 mil. 03/92
21. Royal Caribbean Cruises Environmental $18 mil. 07/99
22. Teledyne Industries Inc. Fraud $17.5 mil. 10/92
23. Northrop False Stmts. $17 mil. 03/90 55
24. Litton Applied Technology Fraud $16.5 mil. 07/99
25. Iroquois Pipeline Operating Environmental $15 mil. 06/96
26. Eastman Chemical Co. Antitrust $11 mil. 10/98
27. Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc. Food and Drug $10.65 mil. 06/97
28. Lonza AG Antitrust $10.5 mil. 03/99
29. Kimberly Home Health Care Fraud $10.08 mil. 07/99
30. Ajinomoto Co. Inc. (tied) Antitrust $10 mil. 10/96
30. (BCCI) (tied) Financial $10 mil. 01/90
30. Kyowa Hakko Kogyo (tied) Antitrust $10 mil. 10/96
30, Warner-Lambert Co.(tied) Food and Drug $10 mil. 12/95
34. General Electric Fraud $9.5 mil. 07/92 5
35. Royal Caribbean (tied) Environmental $9 mil. 06/98
35. Showa Denko Carbon (tied) Antitrust $9 mil. 05/99
37. IBM East Europe/Asia Ltd. Illegal Exports $8.5 mil. 08/98
38. Empire Sanitary Landfill Inc. Campaign Fin. $8 mil. 10/97
39. Colonial Pipeline Co. (tied) Environmental $7 mil. 03/99
39. Eklof Marine Corp.(tied) Environmental $7 mil. 09/97
41. Chevron (tied) Environmental $6.5 mil. 06/92 6
41. Rockwell Int'l Corp.(tied) Environmental $6.5 mil. 04/96
43. Tokai Carbon Ltd. Co. Antitrust $6 mil. 05/99
44. Allied Clinical Labs, (tied) Fraud $5 mil. 11/96
44. Northern Brands Int'l (tied) Fraud $5 mil. 01/99
44. Ortho Pharmaceutical (tied) Obst. of Justice $5 mil. 01/95
44. Unisys (tied) Bribery $5 mil. 09/91 312
44. Georgia Pacific Corp. (tied) Tax Evasion $5 mil. 10/91 94
49. Kanzaki Specialty Papers Antitrust $4.5 mil. 07/94
50. ConAgra Inc. Fraud $4.4 mil. 03/97 84
51. Ryland Mortgage Co. Financial $4.2 mil. 08/98
52. Blue Cross Blue Shield (tied) Fraud $4 mil. 07/98
52. Borden Inc. (tied) Antitrust $4 mil. 03/90
52. Dexter Corp. (tied) Environmental $4 mil. 09/92
52. Southland Corp. (tied) Antitrust $4 mil. 03/90
52. Teledyne Industries (tied) Illegal Exports $4 mil. 02/95
52. Tyson Foods Inc. (tied) Pub.Corruption $4 mil. 01/98 72
58. ALCOA (tied) Environmental $3.75 mil. 07/91
58. Costain Coal Inc. (tied) Worker Death $3.75 mil. 03/93
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58. U.S. Sugar Corp. (tied) Environmental $3.75 mil. 12/91
61. Saybolt, Inc. Environmental $3.4 mil. 08/98
62. Bristol-Myers Squibb (tied) Environmental $3 mil. 05/92 92
62. Chemical Waste Mgmt (tied) Environmental $3 mil. 10/92
62. Ketchikan Pulp Co.(tied) Environmental $3 mil. 04/95
62. United Technologies (tied) Environmental $3 mil. 05/91 51
62. Warner-Lambert Inc. (tied) Environmental $3 mil. 09/97
67. Arizona Chemical Co. (tied) Environmental $2.5 mil. 10/96
67. Consolidated Rail (tied) Environmental $2.5 mil. 07/95
69. International Paper Environmental $2.2 mil. 08/91 71
70. Consolidated Edison (tied) Environmental $2 mil. 11/94 198
70. Crop Growers Corp. (tied) Campaign Fin. $2 mil. 01/97
70. E-Systems Inc. (tied) Fraud $2 mil. 09/90
70. HAL Beheer BV (tied) Environmental $2 mil. 10/98
70. John Morrell and Co. (tied) Environmental $2 mil. 02/96
70. United Technologies (tied) Fraud $2 mil. 09/92 51
76. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. Antitrust $1.8 mil. 07/94
77. Blue Shield of CA (tied) Fraud $1.5 mil. 05/96
77. Browning-Ferris Inc. (tied) Environmental $1.5 mil. 06/98
77. Odwalla Inc. (tied) Food and Drug $1.5 mil. 07/98
77. Teledyne Inc. (tied) False Stmts. $1.5 mil. 09/93
77. Unocal Corp. (tied) Environmental $1.5 mil. 03/94 285
82. Doyon Drilling Inc. (tied) Environmental $1 mil. 05/98
82. Eastman Kodak (tied) Environmental $1 mil. 04/90 149
82. Case Corp. (tied) Illegal Exports $1 mil. 06/96
85. Marathon Oil Environmental $900,000 06/91 35
86. Hyundai Motor Co. Campaign Fin. $600,000 12/95
87. Baxter Int'lInc. (tied) Illegal Boycott $500,000 03/93 220
87. Bethship-Sabine Yard (tied) Environmental $500,000 07/95
87. Palm Beach Cruises (tied) Environmental $500,000 07/99
87. Princess Cruises (tied) Environmental $500,000 07/99
91. Cerestar Bioproducts (tied) Antitrust $400,000 06/98
91. Sun-Land Products (tied) Campaign Fin. $400,000 08/98
93. American Cyanamid (tied) Environmental $250,000 12/90
93. Korean Air Lines (tied) Campaign Fin. $250,000 12/95
93. Regency Cruises Inc. (tied) Environmental $250,000 07/99
96. Adolph Coors Co. (tied) Environmental $200,000 11/90 430
96. Andrew & Williamson (tied) Food and Drug $200,000 11/97
96. Daewoo Int. Corp. (tied) Campaign Fin. $200,000 04/96
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96. Exon Corp. (tied) Environmental $200,000 03/91 2
100. Samsung America Inc. Campaign Fin. $150,00 02/06
TABLE No. 6: THE Top 100 CORPORATE CRIMINALS
OF THE 1990S43
In sum, twenty-one percent of today's Fortune 500, which includes
only American companies, paid a criminal fine of at least $150,000 in
the 1990s.144
G. Corporate Fraud Task Force
In July 2002, the President established the Corporate Fraud Task
Force, which was comprised of a DOJ group focused on corporate
fraud efforts as well as an interagency working group focused on gen-
erating cooperation across law enforcement agencies. The Task
Force's second annual report, published in 2004, noted over five hun-
dred corporate fraud convictions or guilty pleas, an increase of two
hundred and fifty over the previous year. 145 Since inception, the Task
Force had charged over nine hundred defendants and sixty corporate
CEOs and presidents with some type of crime involving corporate
fraud.
H. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Data
DOJ data show that in February 2006, 473 new white collar prose-
cutions were filed. "According to case-by-case information analyzed
by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC)," under
the Freedom of Information Act from the Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys, "this number is down 10.6% from a month before."'146
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, supra note 8.
146. Transactional Access Clearinghouse, White Collar Crime Prosecutions for February 2006,
TRAC REPORTS, INC., Feb. 2006, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreportsbulletins/white collarcrime/
monthlyfeb06/.
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Number Latest Month 473
Percentage Change from Previous Month -10.6
Percentage Change from One Year Ago -2.5
Percentage Change from Five Years Ago (Including Magistrate
Court) --43.3
Percentage Change from Five Years Ago (Excluding Magistrate
Court) --45.4
TABLE No. 7: CRIMINAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROSECUTIONS
FEBRUARY 2006-2001147
TRAC also shows a comparison of monthly 2006 prosecutions with
the same period in the prior year, revealing that filings had dropped
2.5%.148 TRAC notes that not only are prosecutions over the past
year . . . still much lower than they were five years ago," but that
"overall, the data show that prosecutions are down 43.3% from levels
reported in 2001."149 TRAC provides the following figure below,
which depicts graphically a generally declining trend in white collar
crime prosecutions over the last half decade.
Number
1.400 -
1,200
1.000 -
00
400 . .. .
200-
Oct2000 Jun2003 Feb2006
FIGURE A: WHITE COLLAR PROSECUTIONS OVER THE LAST FIVE
YEARS (MOVING AVERAGE) 1 50
The vertical bars count white collar crime prosecutions on a
monthly basis, while the horizontal line represents the six-month mov-
ing average. Intended to even out the fluctuations, the moving aver-
age also forms the basis for the one and five-year rates of change in
Table No. 7 above.
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1. Lead Charge in White Collar Crime Prosecutions
TRAC provides the following pie chart, Figure B, showing that "the
lead investigative agency for white collar prosecutions in February
2006 was the FBI accounting for 43%."151 "Other agencies," it notes,
"with substantial numbers of white collar crime referrals were: Secret
Service (12%), IRS (11%), and Postal Service (10%)."152
43%
11%
12%
24% 10%
r]FBI EPostal Service
[IRS -- Secret service
[l Other
FIGURE B: PROSECUTIONS BY INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY153
Thanks to 28 U.S.C. § 631, the government maintains a system of
Article One magistrate courts, judges of which are appointed to eight
year terms by life-term federal district judges.1 54 With an overall pur-
pose of expediting federal caseloads, in the criminal context, United
States magistrate judges primarily handle misdemeanor and petty of-
fense cases. TRAC provides data attesting that in February 2006,
these courts handled fifteen percent of all white collar cases.1 55 The
breakdown of the most recent data they have published is as follows:
151. Transactional Access Clearinghouse, White Collar Crime Prosecutions for February 2006,
TRAC REPORTS, INC., Feb. 2006, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports~bulletins/whitecollarcrime/
monthlyfeb06/.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2006).
155. Transactional Access Clearinghouse, White Collar Crime Prosecutions for February 2006,
TRAC REPORTS, INC., Feb. 2006, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/white-collar_crime/
monthlyfeb06/. See Alexander et al., supra note 14. See also FED R. CRIM. P. 58(a)(1) (noting in
the Petty Offenses and Other Misdemeanors section that "these rules apply in petty offense and
other misdemeanor cases and on appeal to a district judge in a case tried by a magistrate judge").
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In the magistrate courts ... the most frequently cited lead charge
[31.5% of filings] ... involve[ed b]ank fraud.... Other frequently
prosecuted lead charges included: ". . . Fraud and related activity -
id documents" (12.3%), ..... Conspiracy .. ." (6.8%), " ... Fraud
and related activity - access devices" (6.8%), and "Mail Fraud . .
(6.8%).156
3. United States District Courts
District Courts are full-fledged Article III entities; Table No. 8 be-
low portrays February 2006 lead charges in their domain.
LEAD CHARGE CouNT RANK 1 YR. AGO 5 YRS. AGO
18 US.C. § 1341
Mail Fraud - Frauds and Swindles 56 1 2 2
18 U.S.C. § 1344
Bank Fraud 41 2 1 1
18 U.S.C. § 1343
Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television 34 3 4 5
18 U.S.C. § 1029
Fraud and Related Activity - Access Devices 29 4 5 6
18 U.S.C. § 1028
Fraud and Related Activity - ID Documents 21 5 6 13
18 U.S.C. § 0371 - Conspiracy to Commit
Offense or To Defraud the United States 20 6 3 3
18 U.S.C. § 0287
False, Fictitious or Fraudulent Claims 19 7 16 17
18 U.S.C. § 1001
Fraud/False Statements Generally 16 8 8 7
18 U.S.C. § 0513
Securities of the States and Private Entities 12 9 17 11
18 U.S.C. § 0641
Public Money, Property or Records 12 9 7 12
TABLE No. 8: Top TEN CHARGES FILED IN UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR FEBRUARY 2006157
Mail fraud is evidently the most common lead charge. 158 TRAC
notes, however, that it "was ranked 2nd a year ago as well as five
years ago. 1 59 Bank fraud holds second place, though the statute was
first both one year and five years earlier.' 60 Fraud by wire, radio, or
156. Transactional Access Clearinghouse, White Collar Crime Prosecutions for February 2006,
TRAC REPORTS, INC., Feb. 2006, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/white collarcrime/
monthlyfeb06/. (Note the quotation marks are for title headings and not quotes to other
sources.)
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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television is third in frequency, whereas it was fourth a year earlier
and fifth five years back.161
The lead charge with the largest prosecutorial rise in the past year
was false, fictitious or fraudulent claims; it rose two hundred and fifty
percent. 162 Compared to five years ago, this statute saw an increase of
96.9%.163 By contrast, conspiracy saw a falloff in prosecutions over the
previous year of 32.6%.164 TRAC states that over the last five years
bank fraud experienced the largest prosecutorial decline at 67.8%.165
For purposes of comparison with the foregoing data on the nation's
magistrate system, TRAC provides the following figure, which help-
fully depicts the division of cases between District and .Magistrate
Court.
85% .
E] District Court
D] lfigistrate Court
FIGURE C: DISTRICT COURT VERSES MAGISTRATE COURT1 6 6
4. White Collar Crime Prosecutions by Judicial District
TRAC reported that in February 2006, the DOJ maintained "163.5
white collar crime prosecutions for every ten million people in the
U.S. '167 Since the ninety-four federal judicial districts show a substan-
tial degree of variation in prosecution numbers, TRAC lists the ten
161. Transactional Access Clearinghouse, White Collar Crime Prosecutions for February 2006,
TRAC REPORTS, INC., Feb. 2006, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/white collarcrime/
monthlyfeb06/.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Transactional Access Clearinghouse, White Collar Crime Prosecutions for February 2006,
TRAC REPORTS, INC., Feb. 2006, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/white collarcrime/
monthlyfeb06/. See Alexander et al., supra note 14.
167. Id.
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districts with the largest February numbers (per capita) in Table No.
9.168
JUDICIAL DisTiCT PER CAPITA RANK 1 YR. AGO 5 YRS. AGO
Middle District of Lousiana 1,317 1 - 1
Western District of Tennessee 942 2 2 6
Southern District of Mississippi 793 3 - 8
Western District of Pennsylvania 619 4 16 44
Western District of Kentucky 522 5 - 20
Eastern District of Arkansas 465 6 - 10
Western District of Lousiana 463 7 9 36
Eastern District of Mousiouri 462 8 1 9
Middle District of Pennsylvania 398 9 24 17
Southern District of Ohio 389 10 21 52
TABLE No. 9: Top TEN DISTRICTS (PER TEN MILLION PEOPLE) IN
PER CAPITA PROSECUTIONS, FEBRUARY 2006169
The Middle District of Louisiana (Baton Rouge) registered 1,317
prosecutions in February 2006, soaring far above the nation's average
of 163.5.170 In 2001, it also ranked first.171 The Western District of Ten-
nessee (Memphis) was second in 2006, as it was the year before
that.1 72 The Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson), third in 2006,
was eighth five years previous to that.173 The district experiencing the
most white collar prosecution growth (57.8%) from 2005 to 2006 was
Middle District of Pennsylvania (Scranton). 174 Over five years,
though, the Western District of Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) counted the
most growth (9.4%).175 By contrast, the largest decline in white collar
prosecutions from 2005 to 2006 (10.7%) occurred in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri (St. Louis); the Eastern District of Arkansas (Little
Rock) holds that spot from 2001 to 2006, with a fall of 33.3%.176
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Transactional Access Clearinghouse, White Collar Crime Prosecutions for February 2006,
TRAC REPORTS, INC., Feb. 2006, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreportsbulletins/white-collarcrime/
monthlyfeb06l.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Transactional Access Clearinghouse, White Collar Crime Prosecutions for February 2006,
TRAC REPORTS, INC., Feb. 2006, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreportsbulletins/white-collar-crime/
monthlyfeb06/.
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IV. WHY POOR REPORTING?
There are many plausible explanations for the current state of af-
fairs. This Article, however, will examine three of the most likely sub-
questions of the inquiry. Is better data simply impossible to obtain? Is
the Justice Department too bureaucratic to break with historical iner-
tia? Does the data actually exist and is simply not made public?
A. Obtaining the Data
The first question that may come to mind is whether proper corpo-
rate or white collar criminal data could actually be collected. To an-
swer this, one need only look at the history of criminal data collection
to see, in fact, white collar data has, for most of the life of United
States crime reporting, been collected alongside other more tradi-
tional forms of crime. This suggests quite clearly that whatever report-
ing refinements or additions would be helpful to the community of
interested legislators, investors, and citizens could be achieved with-
out radical systemic changes.
1. History of Uniform Crime Reporting
In 1927, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
formed the Committee on Uniform Crime Records with the goal of
filling the latent need for national police statistics.17 7 The result was
the Uniform Crime Reporting ("UCR") Program of 1929, which in-
cluded a manual disseminated to law enforcement agencies setting of-
fense definition for those crimes known to have occurred whether or
not there was an arrest.1 78 The following seven crimes were prioritized
because of their "seriousness, frequency of occurrence, pervasiveness
in all geographic areas, and likelihood of being reported:" homicide,
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. 179
Other crimes, including white collar categories like fraud and embez-
zlement, were lumped into a second tier. 1 0 During the months follow-
ing the initiation of the program:
[L]aw enforcement agencies in 400 cities from 43 states and the ter-
ritories of Puerto Rico, Alaska, and Hawaii submitted statistics, and
the IACP published the first monthly Uniform Crime Reports for
177. The FBI provides a good history in its UCR Handbook. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK 2-3 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
filelink.html?file=/ucr/handbook/ucrhandbook04.pdf.
178. Id. at 6.
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id.
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the United States and Its Possessions. 181 The pamphlet consisted of
one table, "Number of Offenses Known to the Police: January
1930."182
Later that year, at the urging of the IACP, the Congress passed 28
USC § 534.183 This Act granted the Attorney General the ability to
"acquire, collect, classify, and preserve criminal identification, crime,
and other records" and the ability to appoint officials to oversee this
duty.184 Consistent with this, the FBI, since 1930, has been the data
clearinghouse for the UCR, soliciting, assembling, and publishing lo-
cal, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement agency information.185
The scope of the program has expanded over the decades as a result
of federal mandates and suggestions from law enforcement advisory
groups.186 For example, agencies began contributing data on the age,
sex, and race of arrestees in 1952,187 and national data on the age, sex,
and race of murder victims and the weapon used only became availa-
ble with the advent of the Supplementary Homicide Report in 1962.188
Other important years in the program's evolution include 1978 when
Congress mandated the collection of arson data and 1982 when it or-
dered the FBI to count arson as a basic property offense. 189 After the
Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, the FBI asked agencies to record
and report whether an offense was motivated "in whole or in part by
the offender's bias against a race, religion, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity/national origin." 190 Congress amended this Act in 1994 to in-
clude prejudice against physical or mental disability.191
181. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The Unified Crime Reporting Program, http://www.fbi.gov/
ucr/guidelines/guidelines.htm (last visited May 6, 2008).
182. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK iV (2004),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/filelink.html?file=/ucr/handbook/ucrhandbookO4.pdf
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2006).
184. Id.
185. Interestingly, the principle investigative arm of the DOJ only received its current name in
1935. It was originally unnamed when then-Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte organized its
predecessor group of special agents in 1908. It was renamed various times in the 1930s, settling
on FBI only in 1935.
186. Alexander et al., supra note 14.
187. Id.
188. Barnett, supra note 7.
189. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DATA QUALITY GUIDELINES FOR STATISTICS
(2002), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/guidelines/02DataQualityGuidelinesDownloadable.
doc.
190. H.R. 1048, 101st Cong. (1990).
191. Information about this change can be accessed at Fed. Bureau of Investigation, About
Hate Crime Statistics 2005, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2005/abouthc.htm (last visited May 6, 2008).
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2. Relegation of White Collar Crime
For our purposes, the 1980s was a noteworthy time in the evolution
of crime statistics reporting, because a series of National UCR Con-
ferences was held during those years to determine necessary system
revisions. 192 With members from the IACP, Department of Justice, in-
cluding the FBI, and the newly formed Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS), a "Blueprint for the Future of the Uniform Crime Reporting
Program" was released in 1985.193 The report proposed splitting re-
ported data into two clear divisions, the eight "serious" crimes and
twenty-one less commonly reported crimes. 194 The first category be-
came known as Part I index crimes, and these were further split into
two groups: violent and property crimes. 195 Aggravated assault, forci-
ble rape, murder, and robbery are classified as violent, while arson,
burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft are classified as prop-
erty crimes. 196 The additional twenty-one crimes were considered Part
II index crimes, with the following categories indexed: simple assault,
curfew offenses and loitering, embezzlement, forgery and counterfeit-
ing, disorderly conduct, driving under the influence, drug offenses,
fraud, gambling, liquor offenses, offenses against the family, prostitu-
tion, public drunkenness, runaways, sex offenses, stolen property, van-
dalism, vagrancy, and weapons offenses. 197
A careful look will note the basic white collar offenses assembled
here among the "other" offenses. To say that collection of better,
more specific data (details of what this would look like and potential
limitations are discussed in Part V) is not possible makes no sense in
light of the fact that the entire infrastructure is already in place. There
are problems with the existing system, such as different reporting met-
rics among the states, some non-compliance, and general data biases
(these will be discussed in Part V), but, essentially, little beyond issu-
ing new guidelines to local and state law enforcement agencies would
be required to make changes toward more complete data-collection
mechanisms.
192. Alexander et al., supra note 14.
193. An account of this is provided in the 2005 publication of Crime in the United States,
which can be found at Fed. Bureau of Investigation, About the UCR Program, http://www.fbi.
gov/ucr/05cius/about/about ucr.html (last visited May 6, 2008).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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B. Self-Starting
As it stands, the collection of UCR data is a collaborative effort on
the part of city, county, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement
agencies that voluntarily provide reports on crimes police are aware of
and on persons arrested. For the most part (some states do not have a
UCR program and, thus, submit their data directly to the FBI),19 par-
ticipating agencies prepare monthly crime reports, using uniform in-
dex offense definitions, which are centralized within state
repositories. 199 This collection mostly includes crimes reported by the
public, but also contains crimes that officers discover in the course of
duty. State UCR Programs then forward data to the FBI, which pro-
vides three annual publications: Crime in the United States, Hate
Crime Statistics, and Law Enforcement Officers Killed and As-
saulted.200 Crime in the United States is the primary report, including
offense and arrest data, the number of law enforcement employees,
and particular trend analyses. 201
The execution of this multi-party effort might suggest a well-func-
tioning system, but, nevertheless, a plausible argument for why white
collar and, particularly, corporate criminal data have not occupied a
critical role in statistical reporting terms might be based on bureau-
cratic inertia. A central prong of public choice theory has focused on
the private actions of bureaucratic actors, because agency leaders
often have divergent interests from their public constituency.20 2 Be-
holden to Congress for their budgets or executives for their jobs, en-
tire agencies can become "captured" as Stigler has pointed out.20 3 In
general, public choice theory seeks to marry economic insights to po-
litical science, viewing political actors (in this case, we might broaden
the scope to include the agency itself) as inherently self-interested. 20 4
To understand the current state of white collar reporting, public
choice theory cautions that the right perspective is not that of the pub-
lic interest at large, but rather the incentive structure of the specific
198. Alexander et al., supra note 14.
199. Id.
200. These reports are accessible online at Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Re-
ports, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (last visited May 6, 2008).
201. Id.
202. See generally W. A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy, in DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC CHOICE
(Charles K. Rowley ed., 1987).
203. See Gary Becker & George Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensa-
tion of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974). Has this happened in this case? Probably not, but
there is more to this perspective than mere "capture" theory.
204. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962); KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
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reporting arm. Just as one might examine the expected benefits when
analyzing an individual's actions, it may be useful to look at the entity-
interests of the DOJ. What exactly would the agency stand to gain
from an overhaul of their reporting standards? What does the Bureau
of Justice Statistics specifically stand to gain from even modest re-
form? Apparently little. After all, many of the important changes in
the UCR's history have come at the behest of congressional urging or
outright legislative mandates.20 5 In addition, the bureaucratic inertia
explanation comports with more general organizational theory on
agency interests.2 0 6 A self-initiated move could help the agency and
the federal government as a whole fight white collar crime, but, on the
other hand, it could also highlight more pervasive deficiencies or even
organizational incompetence. In other words, action includes risk.
When the payoff (from the agency's perspective, not the public's) is
small, even modest reform may be outweighed by conservatism. 20 7
One possibility, for example, is that more detailed focus on white col-
lar and corporate crime could upset certain vested interests or cause
intra-agency factional strife. Less dramatically, if white collar crime
was found to impose a large enough burden on the public and the
economy, it could signal the need for more in-depth rebalancing,
opening a Pandora's Box of reform.
As it stands, terrorism has been placed at the top of the agency's
list, with significant resource expansion to also meet the growing
problems of healthcare and credit card fraud.20 8 In spite of these pri-
orities, it is difficult to say whether corporate crime itself garners an
adequate amount of federal attention. A basic problem is that without
proper statistics, it is extremely unclear what a proper resource alloca-
tion might look like. The central question stands: would the DOJ act-
ing on its own have more to lose than it could gain from undertaking
this Article's proposal? While it is also difficult to say, a countervailing
fact is that the DOJ has undertaken organic organizational change in
the past.
205. The founding of the UCR program cuts against this point, but beyond that critical mo-
ment it appears that Congress has taken the reins in terms of organizational action.
206. See generally MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
(1947); R. Congleton, A Model of Asymmetric Bureaucratic Inertia and Bias, PUBLIC CHOICE,
Jan. 1982.
207. MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); DUNCAN BLACK, THE
THEORY OF COMMI-i-EES AND ELECTIONS (1958).
208. The FBI maintains a list of its priorities, which is maintained at Fed. Bureau of Investiga-
tion, Facts and Figures 2003, http://www.fbi.gov/priorities/priorities.htm (last visited May 6,
2008).
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For instance, in response to a general law enforcement need for
more flexible, in-depth data, the UCR program formulated the Na-
tional Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which provides de-
tailed information about particular crime incidents to various law
enforcement agencies, researchers, and the general public. 20 9 The pilot
program was launched in 1987 in the South Carolina Division and has
grown since then.210 The data, however, is still not pervasive enough
to make broad generalizations about United States crime levels. Thus,
like the founding of the UCR program itself, the NIBRS example cuts
both ways. The program got off the ground in seemingly self-starting
fashion, but its execution and evolution has not been carried through
with the same level of expediency. One wonders whether this point
tracks bureaucratic growth more generally in terms of rapid or power-
ful initial catalysts for the creation of an agency or program, followed
by sluggishness, indecisiveness, or even infighting in carrying out the
mission over time.
C. Existing Data
Upon reflection, one might think that the needed data simply must
exist. Were this the case, then this Article is merely a call for publica-
tion of the data. However, there is little reason to assume the neces-
sary data exists and is held under lock and key. First of all, such a state
would defeat much of the purpose of data collection considering part
of the value proposition of the practice is to help the federal govern-
ment at large correctly appropriate money and resources. 21' It would
be illogical to keep white collar crime data confidential. Second, the
history of the UCR, as described in Section A of this Part, shows that
white collar crime data has, in fact, been collected for decades and
published alongside other categories of crime. The point of this Arti-
cle is to decry that, although some data exists, it is, at this point, not
maximally useful. The growth in importance of white collar and cor-
porate crime over the past few decades, particularly the past decade,
has rendered the current reporting system notably insufficient. This is
the case because, as a polity, we evidently intend to focus efforts more
closely on the prevention and punishment of this type of behavior, yet
the existing measurement standards may be limiting our ability to do
209. The Bureau of Justice Statistics provides information on the NIBRS. See U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Imple-
mentation Program, http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/nibrs.htm (last visited May 6, 2008).
210. Id.
211. Barnett, supra note 7.
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so. An implicit point is also that the existing reporting system may be
hiding the true extent of the problem, for better or worse.
From a historical perspective, the state of the current system is un-
derstandable. As the UCR was getting off the ground, white collar
crime was not of the same macro-level concern as street safety.21 2 As
conferences were taking place in the early 1980s, participants unfortu-
nately did not have the sense that corporate and white collar crime
were going to be of critical macro-economic importance. 213 This is
somewhat ironic, considering that the U.S. economy was undergoing
massive transformations in corporate structure and efficiency, literally
as the topic was being discussed at the highest law enforcement
levels.21 4 While economic growth in the United States has seen nu-
merous boom periods, the growth of capital markets in the 1980s,
along with increasingly sophisticated leveraged buyouts and mergers
and acquisitions, was setting the stage for vast new corporate criminal
domains.215
One wonders, however, why categorizations have not been recon-
sidered in this generation. This Part of the Article has explored three
reasons (that the data is too hard to collect; that organizational inter-
ests may not be aligned; and that perhaps such data is better kept
confidential if it were to exist at all) for why this is so. Each plausible
reason has proven unsatisfactory. While excusable eighty years ago,
and perhaps even twenty-five years ago, the fact that there has not
been a formal reassessment of criminal reporting categorizations is al-
most reckless in light of the fact that the federal government is appro-
priating heavily and legislating actively on the issue. Perhaps a fourth,
and at least as likely explanation, is that the topic simply has not re-
ceived the necessary attention. Rather than having been considered
and dismissed or already handled or thought to be proper, revisions in
white collar reporting has been left by the wayside as terrorism, polit-
ics, and daily administrative matters have overshadowed the issue's
importance. If this is the case, as this Section suggests, then the next
212. Note that the term itself and formal study of the topic did not come into play until many
years after the founding of the UCR.
213. This point is merely deductive, in the sense that if they did they probably would have
used the opportunity to steer changes in that direction.
214. For a history and discussion of the changing face of the U.S. corporate economy during
this time, see BARRY WIGMORE, SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE 1980s: THE NEW REGIME 1979-
1984 (1997).
215. Michael Milken's innovations, success, and ultimate fall along with the firm Drexel Burn-
ham are perhaps the most salient features of this time. After a recession during Reagan's first
term, the economy recovered strongly. See generally CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL:
THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (1989);
JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1993).
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Part is intended to provide a preliminary roadmap for thinking about
future legal changes.
V. BEYrER DATA
This Part highlights some of the factors that a more useful and com-
prehensive reporting system would take into account. In doing so, it
might be helpful to first examine some of the basic challenges inherent
in the existing system. Following that, the Part I index crimes will be
discussed to show how they might advise a white collar and corporate
reporting mechanism, but also to demonstrate that they have deficien-
cies as well. The third Section contains specific recommendations.
A. Biases and General Problems in Reporting
The first major criticism of UCR data is that it does not accurately
reflect crime rates because it primarily lists crimes reported to law
enforcement agencies. 216 As such, the entire world of unreported and
undetected criminal conduct is not present. While true, and while this
certainly undercounts the number of crimes in America, this is not
particularly damning. The data do not necessarily purport to be a true
picture of all crime, but only a true picture of crime reported in
America. The key factor, then, is not necessarily the differential be-
tween crime and crimes reported, but the rate of change of this figure.
If the difference between crime and crimes reported is constant, then
this general criticism is not pervasive. If, however, there is significant
fluctuation or if the difference is growing or shrinking steadily, then it
would in fact call into question the value of the data.
Another criticism concerns how the numbers are actually counted.
As it stands, if a number of crimes are connected, only the most seri-
ous one is listed. 217 For instance, if someone was murdered during a
robbery, only murder would be listed. This could underweigh a variety
of secondary crimes. Two countervailing points deserve mention,
though. First, this bias would generally occur exclusively with the pres-
ence of serious crimes. Since serious crimes, like murder, make up a
much smaller percentage of overall crimes, such as robbery, the effect
across the data is probably not great. Second, if someone is murdered
while being robbed, intuition suggests that they were murdered and
not robbed. That is, something qualitative about the more serious
216. See generally MARK COHEN, THE COSTS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (2005).
217. See T.R. MILLER ET AL., VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT (1996).
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crime may tend to diminish society's need or interest in knowing other
crimes carried out contemporaneously.
With regard to counting, there is a particular bias in terms of
rape.218 The UCR defines forcible rape as "the carnal knowledge of a
female forcibly and against her will. ' 219 It thus does not list rapes
against men, nor does it list same-sex rape. It also leaves out broader
definitions of rape. Taken together, these three reasons suggest that
with regard to this particular category such omissions could be
sizable.220
A more systemic problem concerns the differences among state
criminal codes. From the beginning it was recognized that the federal
structure of state autonomy precluded a mere aggregation of state sta-
tistics to arrive at a national total. This is the case because different
states have different crime definitions. Further, because of the vari-
ances in punishment for the same offenses in different state codes, no
distinction between felony and misdemeanor crimes was considered
possible. To skirt some of these problems and provide nationwide uni-
formity, the UCR formulated standardized offense definitions by
which law enforcement agencies were to submit data without regard
for local statutes. This, however, means that some states, and more
particularly, some localities, often fail to comply properly and their
data is not able to be included. According to the FBI, approximately
ninety-four percent of the U.S. population resides in law enforcement
jurisdictions that participate in the UCR program. 221 This is quite an
achievement, but considering the variability among specific jurisdic-
tions, this is far from perfect.
B. Part I Index Crimes
As noted earlier, the Part I index offenses are homicide, rape, rob-
bery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. 22 2 These
are divided into a Violent Crime Index which includes homicide, rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault and a Property Crime Index, which
contains burglary, larceny, auto theft, and, since 1982, arson.22 3 Con-
218. For a thorough discussion on this issue, see DEAN G. KILPATRICK & KENNETH J. RUG-
GIERO, MAKING SENSE OF RAPE IN AMERICA: WHERE Do THE NUMBERS COME FROM AND
WHAT Do THEY MEAN? 4 (2004).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Alexander et al., supra note 14.
222. The FBI provides a good history in its UCR Handbook. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK 2 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/file
link.html?fdle=/ucr/handbook/ucrhandbook04.pdf
223. Id.
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sidering the variety of biases and problems noted above and the fact
that there are other forms of violent and property crime, the indices
surely do not accurately measure crime, even in these delimited areas.
Then again, they purport only to be a yardstick or proxy for crime
measurement in these areas. On that count, the breakdowns are some-
what helpful since they comport reasonably well with intuitive judg-
ments about how one might classify crime. This perspective may
suggest an analogously separate conceptual structure for the reporting
of white collar and corporate crime. This is discussed as the first tier
recommendation in the next Section.
Granting the conceptual usefulness of the current reporting of Part
I index crimes, the most striking feature is not that the Violent and
Property Crime Indexes leave out certain crimes one might like to see
included, but that the indexes are merely the sum of the crimes in the
listed categories. For example, the Violent Crime Index consists of ad-
ding up the number of reported murders, rapes, robberies, and aggra-
vated assaults and publishing them. This does not mesh with a prima
facie, common-sense judgment about the relative seriousness of the
crimes; the average murder is surely more serious than the average
robbery. Imagine two states equal in every possible way, including
equal Violent Crime Indexes. Further imagine that one state has five
times as much murder as the other, but that this fact is disguised by a
corresponding rise in absolute terms in aggravated assault (consider-
ing that there are many more aggravated assaults than murders, this
would be a much smaller percentage increase) in the second state.
This is a fact one would like to know, perhaps even a fact on which
one would make a decision about which state to reside in, but it is
troublingly unapparent from the index.
Not surprisingly, there has been a relatively long history of attempts
to weight the seriousness of crimes. 224 This could be useful in a variety
of contexts, including for more accurate crime trends, appropriation of
money used to fight crime, and for regular consumers of crime infor-
mation such as scholars and average citizens. The main problem with
traditional attempts to weight the seriousness of crime, however, is
that they have often sought to use a survey-based methodology.2 25
This involves asking victims, through random surveys, various ques-
tions about how one crime compares on a numerical scale with an-
other crime or how certain victimizations might compare with a
hypothetical crime. 226 Potential problems of bias and inaccuracy are
224. For more information, see the introduction in COHEN, supra note 221.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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rife. Other attempts have sought to use jury awards or hedonic pricing
approaches to find the cost of crime and through that to place relative
values on the different categories. 227
As cost estimates have improved, however, a potentially new ap-
proach is to weight the indexes using collective data (based on tangi-
ble and intangible factors) on the average cost of different crimes. 228
This could be highly beneficial because it relies on more concrete esti-
mations of cost than previously were available and it would provide a
readily usable relative measuring system not dependent on individual
survey estimations. Considering that the Violent and Property Crime
Indexes are referenced in numerous ways in scholarship, media, and
even legislation, a more accurately balanced index could have serious
ramifications. It also suggests that corporate and white collar crime
reporting could borrow from this ground-breaking research in due
time.229
C. White Collar Data
As an example of the vagueness and indeterminacy which currently
shrouds public discussion, one needs to look no further than the FBI's
publications. For instance, a 2002 report on the state of white collar
crime reporting concludes anemically that "tremendous growth of and
involvement in the securities and commodities markets at the institu-
tional, corporate, and private investor levels have led to great num-
bers of individuals involved in intentional corporate fraud and
misconduct. ' 230 Great numbers? To say that there have been "great
numbers" of corporate and individual fraud of late sounds unscientific
at best. At worst, it sounds like a "hunch," which is exactly the kind of
policy motivations that good data can help eliminate. The FBI does
note that it is currently investigating over 189 major corporate
frauds.23' While important, and perhaps even laudable, it would be
useful to have comprehensive data. This would include smaller (but
still corporate) frauds and would allow for, again, better information
227. See James P. Lynch & Mona Danner, Offense Seriousness Scaling: An Alternative to Sce-
nario Methods, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 309 (2005).
228. The author is involved in a novel study with Ian Ayres and Isra Bhatty using recent cost
estimates to reformulate the indexes and to see how dollar-weighting affects state and other
rankings.
229. Ayres, Ian, Isra Bhatty, and Zachary Bookman, Using Dollar Severity Weights to Assess
the Aggregate Victimization Costs of Crime, (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
230. Barnett, supra note 7.
231. See Center for Corporate Policy, 2006 Budget Analysis, http://www.corporatepolicy.org/
topics/budget.htm (last visited May 6, 2008).
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on which to make policy decisions. Considering the foregoing, the fol-
lowing two levels of recommendations, each with two specific recom-
mendations, are called for. The list is organized as such for ease of
presentation, but a wholesale effort at developing better white collar
crime reporting procedures would take the entire set of recommenda-
tions into account at the same time.
1. Tier One Recommendations
A white collar index should be carved out of the Part II index
crimes section of the Uniform Crime Report. This would aggregate in
a single readily accessible place, and as a single number as well, the
already existing categories of fraud, forgery and counterfeiting, brib-
ery, and embezzlement. Instead of merely noting what investigations
are underway or talking about the largest and most salient convic-
tions, this collection would start as a framing point for any discussion
on white collar crime. One could imagine that this number or this data
set would quickly gain in importance and salience as it was dissemi-
nated to the public at large. It would be easy to report on Wall Street
as an additional macroeconomic indicator, and it would signal a re-
newed commitment on behalf of the federal government against illicit,
market-corrupting behavior.
While simple, this recommendation is of the first order of impor-
tance because, currently, these white collar categories are merely four
randomly listed classifications among the 21 Part II index crimes.
They are thus not readily accessible to the public because of the work
required to single the categories out and then aggregate the figures by
hand. The next Subsection on Tier Two recommendations will talk
about seriousness weighting (and its potential for problems in the
white collar domain), but this does not qualify as a first order need
because there is not even a white collar index to speak of as of yet.
A second recommendation, and one which is far more aggressive in
terms of organizational imperative, is to split these categories along
corporate and personal lines. As the general public talks heavily about
the pervasive influence of corporate crime, and since the government
purports to be taking this threat seriously, it would make sense to
have a separate indicator of corporate prosecutions. 232 There are at
least two reasons for this, both revolving around the fact that corpora-
tions are different beasts than individuals. First, they use the imprima-
tur of the corporate form (a legal fiction of state sponsorship), which
232. See e.g., The White House, The President's Leadership in Combating Corporate Fraud,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/corporateresponsibility/ (last visited May 6, 2008).
388 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
imparts a clear, organizational aspect to the crime. In definitional
terms, then, such a distinction makes sense. Secondly, corporate white
collar crimes may tend to be larger or more costly than individual
crimes. Breaking this out may be helpful for better understanding so-
ciety's white collar crime problem and assessing strategic approaches
to it.
This recommendation would require a reformulation of federal re-
porting guidelines. While no small task, this has been done before and
could be done again.233 Law enforcement agencies at all levels would
be asked to record whether it is a corporate interest at stake or an
individual acting in his or her own capacity. There is much other infor-
mation, like magnitude and other data (discussed next), that could be
garnered, which would be extremely telling about the state of corpo-
rate crime, but the basic framework would help provide a measure of
comprehensiveness that is currently lacking from reports and figures
on the subject. It would also likely engender much new research on
the subject, which could return further dividends over time.234
2. Tier Two Recommendations
There may be considerable room to expand the offense categories
associated with white collar crime and, thus, to broaden the reporting
classifications overall. This recommendation raises again the question
of the nature of exactly white collar crime. Is it just economic crime?
If so, this could include all sorts of other criminal activities such as
certain cyber crimes and many more mundane property crimes.
Should the definition have an element of "white collar" or class-based
elitism involved? This may be too restrictive because many offenses
are not committed by executives or even the well-off. Must white col-
lar crime have an organizational element to it as was suggested by the
last recommendation? Perhaps in certain cases, but defining white col-
lar crime exclusively could make it overly restrictive because many
important crimes are committed by individual actors without the cor-
porate aegis.
The FBI has opted to approach white collar crime in terms of the
offense, defining it as follows:
[T]hose illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, concealment,
or violation of trust and which are not dependent upon the applica-
tion or threat of physical force or violence. Individuals and organi-
zations commit these acts to obtain money, property, or services; to
233. Alexander et al., supra note 14.
234. For a discussion of new areas of research and their expected returns, see the conclusion
of COHEN, supra note 221.
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avoid the payment or loss of money or services; or to secure per-
sonal or business advantage.235
While controversial in light of the foregoing discussion, this definition
is not unduly problematic in and of itself. It does make the definitional
choice, however, and, thus, leaves the door open for many different
types of crime to be included. For instance, there is UCR data on bad
checks. Fraud itself is sometimes broken into five subcategories: false
pretenses/swindle/confidence games, credit card/ATM fraud, imper-
sonation, welfare fraud, and wire fraud. 236 In addition, there is a host
of other possibilities for inclusion, including jury tampering, strategic
bankruptcies, tax law violations, and various misappropriations.
Many questions can therefore be raised about what categories
should be included and how to approach the issue at all. For instance,
should fraud actually be listed by its component parts? Is the FBI of-
fense definition approach even the right one? If not, what would be
better? On this point, this Article's recommendation is concerned less
with the exact components of a white collar crime index and more
with developing a workable solution through informed dialogue on
the subject. The groundwork has already been laid, since, in the past
decade, there has been a resurgence of academic interest on the topic.
The key point is that this academic attention should be translated into
actual government level policy consensus. Just as the Violent and
Property Crime Indexes purport only to be proxies for crime in those
areas (and, thus, do not include all possible categories) a white collar
index could be successfully employed using a selective approach. Nev-
ertheless, the particular categories should be scrutinized in a multi-
agency committee process.
A second Tier Two recommendation concerns seriousness rankings.
Once a white collar crime index has been formally established with
differentiation between corporate and individual crimes (and, per-
haps, also after something approaching industry consensus has been
reached regarding what classifications to include in the index itself),
then attention should properly turn to seriousness rankings. As previ-
ously noted with regard to the Violent and Property Crime Indexes,
knowing the relative measurements, and even the average costs of
crimes and crime categories, could aid multiple decision makers be-
cause the magnitude of the crimes, as opposed to just the tally of the
act itself, contains critical information. It could answer the fundamen-
tal question, raised at the beginning of this Article, of whether the
government is legislating in response to a series of large scandals, or
235. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UCR HANDBOOK: NIBRS EDITION 3 (1992).
236. Alexander et al., supra note 14.
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whether there is a more deeply ingrained problem in the fabric of our
economy and social apparatus. It could advise federal law enforce-
ment practices, because different approaches with differing levels of
sophistication may be required for large versus small white collar
crimes. It could also potentially direct future congressional legislation,
not to mention countless decisions in state and local governments
about the use of resources, prosecution decisions, and organizational
approaches. 237
It should be noted, however, that in terms of categories like bribery,
fraud, etc., it is not as intuitively obvious that the dollar cost differen-
tial would be as striking as it is with violent crime. 238 The real differen-
tial probably lies in the corporate-individual distinction. Considering
Sarbanes-Oxley and the President's Corporate Fraud Task Force are
directed precisely at that subsection of the white collar crime problem,
one can imagine that a corporate white collar crime index, A la recom-
mendation two in Tier One above, would be of primary use.
Like the Tier One recommendation regarding corporate reporting,
this final recommendation would require an overhaul of the federal
reporting guidelines. This might not be as difficult as it sounds, consid-
ering such data is collected on many types of property crimes and the
National Incident-Based Reporting Service also is capable of collect-
ing detailed data. 239 Nevertheless, as noted originally, it might make
sense to consider this proposal in sum with the previous recommenda-
tions because significant time and energy savings could result if this
was done in conjunction with other reforms.
VI. CONCLUSION
White collar and particularly corporate crime has not only changed
the criminal landscape, but deeply affected the American economy. 240
Though this fact is recognized by the FBI, Congress, and the President
in the form of legislation, internal policies, and appropriations, it has
237. States do not have a single crime-fighting budget, but rather many dispersed actors and
organizations, each with their own budgets, making many micro-decisions about resource
consumption.
238. Differences in the cost of different violent crimes is striking indeed. See MILLER ET AL.,
supra note 222. This issue is further fleshed out in the author's forthcoming paper re-ranking the
violent and property crime indexes.
239. See supra text accompanying note 205.
240. See, e.g., The White House, The President's Leadership in Combating Corporate Fraud,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/corporateresponsibility/ (last visited May 6, 2008) (specifi-
cally the September 26, 2002, Speech at Corporate Fraud Conference, where President Bush
notes that "high-profile acts of deception in corporate America have shaken people's trust in
corporations, the markets and the economy").
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not spurred the necessary structural reporting adjustments. More ac-
curate and effective data in the area of white collar crime could aid
lawmakers in how they approach legislative reform, law enforcement
in how crime is prosecuted within the existing legal infrastructure and
within existing resource constraints, the media in how it reports crime
and scandal, and citizen-investors in how they evaluate the relative
prospects of American companies and the stability of the domestic
economy.
This Article has argued that the basic conceptual approach of the
Department of Justice to reporting in this area of crime is insufficient.
First, it fails to aggregate white collar crime into a separately reporta-
ble white collar crime index. Second, it fails to differentiate between
personal and corporate crime. Third, no consensus has been reached
regarding either the definition of white collar crime itself or, rather,
what white collar crimes should be included in white collar reporting.
Finally, once the foregoing recommendations have been considered
and implemented, the Article suggests that the index could be dollar-
cost indexed. This could provide useful data for determining the per-
vasiveness of white collar crime compared with other types of crime
and for comparing individual categories of white collar crime to one
another to determine the overall characteristics of white collar crime
in America. It could also pull out a separate white collar corporate
crime index, which may be the most easily packageable data set on the
subject, considering that the many stakeholders seem particularly con-
cerned with corporate crime as a subset of white collar crime.
Considering the discussion in Part III regarding reasons why none
of these recommendations have taken place, the best audience for this
Article is Congress. From an institutional level, Congress is well
equipped to hold hearings on these recommendations and to make
precise determinations about their contours. In addition, a congres-
sional act mandating reporting in compliance with determined judg-
ments on these questions would probably be the most effective and
efficient way to see these improvements implemented.
Something similar happened in April 1990, when Congress enacted
the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 ("Act"). 241 The Act forced:
[T]he Attorney General to establish guidelines and collect, as part
of the UCR Program, data "about crimes that manifest evidence of
prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity,
including the crimes of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter; for-
cible rape; robbery; aggravated assault; burglary; larceny-theft; mo-
241. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The Unified Crime Reporting Program, http://www.fbi.govl
ucr/guidelines/guidelines.htm (last visited May 6, 2008).
392 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
tor vehicle theft; arson; simple assault; intimidation; and
destruction, damage or vandalism of property. '242
As a result, "the FBI in conjunction with the Department of Justice
developed procedures for and implemented the collection of hate
crime data" through the UCR program. 243 "In September 1994, the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act amended the Hate
Crime Statistics Act to add disabilities, both physical and mental, as
factors that could be considered a basis for hate crime. '2 44 While
"there are many kinds of bias,... those mandated by the enabling Act
[and, thus, those reported] ... currently include[ ] race, religion, disa-
bility, sexual orientation, and ethnicity/national origin. '245
This Act serves as an excellent case in point for reforming white
collar procedure. As an administrative department, the DOJ and its
subordinate agency, the FBI, may actually be dependent on congres-
sional action in order to surmount vested interests and bureaucratic
inertia. A legislative act requiring comprehensive and accurate figures
on white collar and corporate crime data would be well aligned with
Congress's mission to fight corporate scandal, and it could further em-
power investors, academia, the media, and ordinary citizens interested
in the state of crime and corporate ethics. If Congress cares as much
as it asserts, it should rectify the situation so sheepishly admitted to by
the Department of Justice itself in 2002: "The true extent and expense
of white collar crime are [currently] unknown. Summary-based UCR
statistics can provide only a limited amount of information on a lim-
ited number of offenses."2 46
242. Id. (quoting Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1990)). Alexander et al.,
supra note 14.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Barnett, supra note 7.
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